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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to lower her costs and pay off her debt, Elizabeth Redrick
took out a new mortgage on her home.' However, instead of reducing her
debt, Elizabeth was charged with thousands of dollars in fees and mortgage
payments she could not afford.2 Like many other minority homeowners,
Elizabeth is now on the verge of losing her home because of a subprime
loan.3 Thousands of minorities like Elizabeth lacked protection under the
Supreme Court's decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., which held

that operating subsidiaries of national banks were not subject to state
regulatory visitation. 4 Presumably, this decision meant that national banks
did not have to comply with state predatory lending laws, which was likely
to contribute to the growing wave of foreclosures. However, the Court's
recent decision in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n properly limited the
1. See Beth Gorham, U.S. 'Subprime' Mortgage Crisis Hitting Blacks, Latinos
Hardest, YAHOO! CANADA FINANCE, May 19, 2008, http://ca.news.finance.yahoo.com
/s/19052007/2/biz-finance-u-s-subprime-mortgage-crisis-hitting-blacks-latinos.html
(stating that the housing boom allowed lenders to issue loans to borrowers who could
not afford to repay the loan).
2. See id. (noting that lenders may not disclose the fees and charges associated
with a subprime loan).
3. See id (claiming that 250 different types of mortgage loan products make it
difficult even for experts to meaningfully evaluate them).
4. See 550 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2007) (holding instead that operating subsidiaries are
subject to supervision by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2717 (2009) (defining visitation as the right to
oversee a national bank's corporate affairs).
5. See Brief for the Federal Respondent at 42, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n,
129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08-453) (contending that enforcement of states' fair
lending laws may undermine the national banking system).
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effects of Watters by holding that the National Bank Act does not prohibit
states from enforcing state predatory lending laws against national banks.6
This Note first argues that Cuomo properly held that the National Bank
Act does not prohibit state enforcement of state predatory lending laws.7
Second, that preemption of state enforcement of state law requires clear
congressional intent.8 Third, that the visitation regulation promulgated by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") under the National
Bank Act has a disparate impact on minorities in violation of the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA").9 Part II examines the emergence of the subprime
mortgage market, the state and federal measures enacted to curb predatory
lending, the application of a disparate impact analysis to FHA claims, and
the history of federal statutory and regulatory preemption of state law. 10
Part III argues that Cuomo properly overruled the OCC's interpretative
regulation because visitation differs from law enforcement and because
there is no clear congressional intent preempting state enforcement of state
law. Accordingly, it argues that the Court should apply a disparate impact
analysis to national banks' subjective lending practices as they have a
disparate impact on minorities, in violation of the FHA. 1 Part IV
recommends that Congress should complement, not preempt, state
enforcement of state predatory lending laws. 12 Part V concludes that unless
Congress clearly intended to preempt state law, courts should not interpret
the federal regulation as preempting state enforcement of state law when
the regulation has a disparate impact on minorities.' 3
6. See 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) (forbidding states from exercising visitorial
power against national banks unless authorized by federal law); Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at
2717 (ruling that visitation differs from enforcement of state law).
7. See 129 S. Ct. at 2717 (stressing that the National Bank Act prohibits states
only from exercising visitorial powers over national banks).
8. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that
federal law should not preempt states' historic police powers without clear
congressional intent).
9. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2005) (exempting national banks from state oversight);
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that under certain circumstances, a plaintiff may prove a violation of the
FHA by showing discriminatory effect).
10. See infra Part II (tracing the federal statutes enacted to protect borrowers from
subprime lending and the states' response to enact stronger consumer measures, courts'
broad interpretation of the FHA through application of Title VII disparate impact
analysis to FHA claims, and courts' reluctance to issue rulings that preempt state law
without clear congressional intent).
11. See infra Part III (advocating the view that law enforcement differs from
visitorial powers, that Congress did not intend to preempt states' historic police
powers, and that the similarities between Title VII and the FHA support an application
of a disparate impact analysis to FHA claims).
12. See infra Part IV (urging that state predatory lending laws are more effective
than federal law and provide stronger consumer protection).
13. See infra Part V (concluding that states have an interest in protecting minorities

320

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 18:2

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Emergence of the Subprime Mortgage Market and Predatory
Lending
During the 1990s, while the mortgage lending industry was expanding,
the value of the subprime mortgage market also increased from $35 billion
in 1994 to $625 billion by 2006.14 Subprime loans are made to borrowers
who fail to qualify for a prime loan, providing many low-income5
individuals and minorities with an otherwise unavailable source of credit.'
However, while the subprime market provides risky borrowers access to
loans, many of these loans target low-income individuals and minorities in
a "predatory" manner.' 6
Compared to whites, Latino and AfricanAmerican first-time borrowers disproportionately receive less favorable
loan terms. 17 These disparities may be the result of a lender's subjective
pricing policies that tend to discriminate against minorities, as loan officers
tend

to issue

minorities
8

creditworthiness. 1

higher

interest rates that are

unrelated

to

B. CongressEnacted the FHA and Title VII to EradicateDiscrimination
In 1968, during the Civil Rights Era, Congress enacted the FHA as a
response to residential segregation and lending discrimination. 9 The FHA
from abusive lenders and courts should not undermine states' interests).
14. See generally Roberto G. Quercia et al., Assessing the Impact of North
Carolina'sPredatory Lending Law, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 573-74 (2004)
(stating that the mortgage expansion emerged to provide access to underserved
populations); Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Shrugged as Subprime Spread, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2007, at Al (explaining that subprime loans are high interest loans intended
for individuals with poor credit histories).
15. But cf Elvin K. Wyly et al., American Home: PredatoryMortgage Capital and
Neighborhood Spaces of Race and Class Exploitation in the United States, 88 B(1)
GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER [GEOGR. ANN.] 105, 107 (2006) (Swed.) (citing to evidence
that shows many subprime borrowers actually qualify for a prime loan).
16. See, e.g., Allen Fishbein & Harold Bunce, Subprime Market Growth &
Predatory Lending, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 280-81 (Susan M.
Wachter & R. Leo Penne eds., 2000), http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdfibrd/
13Fishbein.pdf (describing how lenders can use a borrower's home equity to issue him
a loan without considering the borrower's ability to repay the loan).
17. See, e.g., DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME

MORTGAGES 3 (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/researchanalysis/rrO 1-Unfair Lendin -0506.pdf (concluding that after taking a borrower s risk
into account, minorities are thirty percent more likely than whites to receive higher loan
rates).
18. See, e.g., id. at 4-5, 10, 20 (noting that the lending disparities between AfricanAmericans and whites are greater with regard to loan prepayment penalties).
19. See 114 CONG. REC. S3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (recognizing
that while the courts and Congress have attempted to eliminate segregationist practices,
a black individual is not free to live where he wishes).
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prohibits discrimination in the sale, financing, or renting of dwellings.2 °
Similarly, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to address
employment discrimination.2 ' In enacting both Title VII and the FHA,
Congress expressed that certain immutable characteristics should not be
factors in housing and employment decisions, and both statutes prohibit
neutral policies that have a disparate impact on members of a protected
class.22
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court first recognized that neutral
practices that are discriminatory in application are unlawful. 23 The Court
noted that congressional intent required the removal of arbitrary barriers
that discriminated on the basis of race.2 4 Furthermore, in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, the Court held that in some cases a disparate impact
analysis should be applied to employment decisions that rely on subjective
25
criteria.
While the disparate impact analysis developed through Title VII cases,
courts also apply this analysis to FHA claims.26 For example, in
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
a showing
the court stated that the FHA's legislative history did not require
27
of intentional discrimination to prove a discrimination claim.

20. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (declaring that it is unlawful to deny the rental or
sale of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. §
3608(a) (2006) (charging the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") with the responsibility of administering the Act).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (forbidding employment practices that

discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-4 (2006) (stating that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") is responsible for enforcing Title VII).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) (enacting the FHA "to provide fair housing within
the constitutional limitations"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
(holding that Title VII prohibits overt discrimination); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill.
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that courts
should read Title VII and the FHA broadly to prohibit practices that have a disparate
impact on minorities); S. REP. No. 92-415, at 5 (1971) (acknowledging that
employment discrimination expands far beyond intentional discrimination into
discrimination that is perpetrated through "systems" and "effects").
23. See 401 U.S. at 431-32 (prohibiting requirements that a job applicant have a
high school diploma and pass a general intelligence test when such requirements are
not related to the job).
24. See id at 429-31 (clarifying that the purpose of Title VII was to achieve equal
employment opportunities).
25. See 487 U.S. 977, 989, 991 (1988) (reasoning that a failure to apply disparate
impact analysis to subjective criteria would shield employers from liability for
discriminatory practices).
26. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1289 (rationalizing that if courts can
rely on statistical evidence to prove discriminatory intent under Title VII, then courts
can rely on statistical evidence to prove FHA claims).
27. See id. at 1289-90 (explaining that one type of discriminatory effect occurs
when a neutral policy adversely affects one racial group more than another).
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Pursuant to Title VII and the FHA, in order to establish a prima facie
case alleging disparate impact, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) a specific
and actionable policy or practice, 2) a disparate impact, and 3) facts raising
a sufficient inference of causation.2 8 In Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A.,
the court held that the use of subjective factors in mortgage lending,
unrelated to creditworthiness, qualifies as a specific and actionable
policy. 29 Moreover, in Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortgage FundingInc., the
court affirmed that the practice of using subjective factors to determine
loan charges is subject to a disparate impact analysis and considered data
reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") in support
of a disparate impact claim. 30 Both cases confirm that courts have
established a framework for applying a disparate impact analysis in a
predatory lending context.
C. Federaland State Measures Enacted to Curb PredatoryLending
In addition to the FHA, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA") in 1968 to promote informed borrowing by requiring lenders to
disclose loan terms and conditions. 31 Additionally, in 1974, Congress
passed the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") to prohibit
excessive settlement costs. 32 Furthermore, in 1978, Congress passed the
HMDA, which requires certain public disclosures to ensure that mortgage
lending institutions serve their communities.33 Specifically, the HMDA
requires compilation and annual reports of lending activity pertaining to
home purchase and home improvement loans.34 Moreover, in 1999,
Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
("HOEPA") to address reverse redlining by protecting low-income

28. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241-42 (2005) (holding that a
plaintiff-employee is responsible for isolating the specific practice that results in
statistical disparities).
29. See 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 255, 258-59 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that subjective
criteria may be legitimate in making employment decisions, but that they have no role
in determining a borrower's creditworthiness).
30. See 633 F. Supp. 2d 922, 928-29 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (observing that the HDMA
data indicated that minority customers were "almost 50% more likely" to pay more for
their loan than white customers).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (explaining that for reasons of economic
stability and fairness, consumers should be made aware of the cost of the credit
extended to them).
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (2006) (articulating the goal of eliminating
kickbacks and referral fees that unjustifiably increase the cost of lending services).
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006) (remarking that some depository institutions fail
to provide adequate home financing to qualified individuals); 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2006)
(detailing the method by which lenders must disclose lending activity information).
34. See § 2803 (stating that national banks are to report the number and dollar
amount of loans originating from or purchased by them to the OCC).
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homeowners from abusive lending tactics. 35 Still, despite the federal
government's many efforts to curb predatory lending, its effectiveness is
rather limited.36 For example, HOEPA fails to protect consumers against
"junk fees" and "loan flipping."3 7 Additionally, while the TILA requires
lenders to disclose certain loan terms to borrowers, oftentimes, lenders may
disclose loan terms in a manner too sophisticated for borrowers to fully
laws have forced states
understand. 38 Thus, the largely ineffective federal
39
to enact tougher consumer protection measures.
North Carolina became the first state to pass a law restraining predatory
lending. 40 Like HOEPA, North Carolina's law attempts to monitor highcost loans, but North Carolina's law is more inclusive than HOEPA. 41
Even though North Carolina enacted strong predatory lending laws that
have provided greater consumer protection than federal law and have
achieved a modest reduction in predatory lending, the state's subprime
41
market remains active.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (2006) (forbidding prepayment penalties if a
borrower's total debt exceeds fifty percent of his or her income at the time of the loan);
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., JOINT REPORT
ON RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 53 (2000),
http://www.huduser.org/ publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY] (defining
reverse redlining as the practice of marketing high-cost loans to potential customers in
communities whose residents were denied credit access in the past).
36. See TREASURY, supra note 35, at 61 (recommending that TILA and RESPA can
be strengthened by increasing the availability of counseling to high-cost borrowers
before they commit to a loan).
37. See Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of

PredatoryLending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2274, 2282 (2004) (noting that junk fees
permit lenders to avoid HOEPA by adding unnecessary costs that appear to be loan
related); Fishbein & Bunce, supra note 16, at 281 (explaining that through loan
flipping, fees incurred by repeated, successive refinancing depletes equity in a home).
38. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the PredatoryLending Circle: A Casefor States as
Laboratoriesof Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 352 (2005) (pointing out that

borrowers do not receive loan terms and conditions until the day of closing the loan).
39. See id.at 395 (highlighting the fact that state officials are more politically
accountable than congress, and thus, more likely to address constituents' grievances).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1E(c) (West 2009) (requiring borrowers to
receive pre-loan counseling from the state, prohibiting lending without consideration of
a borrower's ability to repay the loan, and prohibiting lender financing of fees); KEITH
ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA'S SUBPRIME HOME
(2002),
REFORM
2
AFTER
PREDATORY
LENDING
LOAN
MARKET

http://www.responsiblelending.org/north-carolina/nc-mortgage/researchanalysis/
HMDA Study on NC Market.pdf (showing that the law passed with a broad base of
consumer and industry support).
41. See ERNST ET AL., supra note 40, at 2 (explaining that North Carolina's law
protects consumers by prohibiting loan fees exceeding five percent of a loan, balloon
payments, and refinancing, in circumstances where the borrower would not receive a
net benefit).
42. See id (claiming that one year after the enactment of predatory lending reform,
North Carolina borrowers were still twenty percent more likely than other U.S.
borrowers to receive a subprime loan); Fishbein & Bunce, supra note 16, at 274, 276
(recognizing that despite the benefits that subprime lending affords to borrowers with
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D. FederalStatutory and RegulatoryPreemption of State Law
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Congress may
preempt state predatory lending laws.43 However, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., the Supreme Court stated that a presumption against
preemption applies to state laws enacted according to states' historic police
powers. 4

Similarly, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court recognized that

preemption of state law required unequivocal congressional intent, and
thus, the Court refused to allow a federal law to preempt a state law that
mandated retirement for appointed state judges.45 In upholding the validity
of the state law, the Court noted that the state law neither conflicted with
federal law nor violated the Constitution.46
On the other hand, in Barnett Bank of Marion, N.A. v. Nelson, the Court

held that the state law posed an obstacle to the objectives of the federal
government and was preempted by federal law.47 Yet, in upholding the
preemption of state law, Barnett relied on the express language of the
federal law.4 8
Like federal law, federal regulations may also preempt state law. 49 For
instance, in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, the
Court upheld a federal regulation that preempted a state law prohibiting

unreasonable restraints on property law.5 °

However, in upholding the

5
federal regulation, the Court also relied on clear congressional intent. '

poor credit histories, lenders tend to engage in predatory lending due to the lack of
federal monitoring).
43. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that all laws made pursuant to the
Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land).
44. See 331 U.S. 218, 230-32 (1947) (recognizing that states traditionally regulated
warehouse licenses).
45. See 501 U.S. 452, 461, 464-67 (1991) (refusing to allow federal preemption of
a state law requiring appointed judges to retire at seventy because appointed judges are
not covered by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")).
46. See id. at 467-69 (noting that congressional language excluding "appointees at
the policymaking level" from the protections of the ADEA is broad enough to conclude
that Congress did not intend for state judges to be covered by the Act).
47. See 517 U.S. 25, 31-32, 37 (1996) (invalidating a state law that permitted
national banks to sell insurances in small towns on the grounds that it contradicted
federal law).
48. See id. at 31 (recognizing that even if congressional preemption is not explicitly
stated, courts need to examine whether such intent exists).
49. Compare Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (holding that if congressional intent is ambiguous courts will defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation), with Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34,
42 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that permitting judicial deference whenever an agency issues
a rule violates the Supremacy Clause).
50. See 458 U.S. 141, 149, 154 (1982) (noting that a federal agency is subject to
judicial review when it exceeds its congressionally delegated authority or acts
arbitrarily).
51. See id. at 160, 164 (stressing that Congress granted the Federal Home Loan
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Similarly, in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., the Court upheld a federal
regulation ruling that the National Bank Act prohibited states from
exercising general supervision and control over the operating subsidiaries
of national banks.52 In upholding the OCC's regulation, the Court allowed
for the preemption of a Michigan state law that was enacted to protect
consumers, noting that the state law burdened the national banking
system.5 3
E. Cuomo v. Clearing House Association
Two years later, in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, the Court once
again interpreted the National Bank Act.54 After data from the HDMA
revealed ethnic and racial disparities in the interest rates charged by
national banks, New York's Attorney General sent letters to various
national banks and their operating subsidiaries.55 In response, the OCC
filed a suit to enjoin compliance with the state's request, arguing that the
OCC's regulation prohibited states from enforcing state lending laws
against national banks.56
The OCC stressed that pursuant to the Riegle-Neal Act, preemption did
not require express congressional intent.57 Additionally, the OCC argued
that the Riegle-Neal Act authorized the OCC to preempt state law,
including consumer protection laws. 58 The Supreme Court held that the
Bank Board ("Board") substantial authority to issue regulations regarding federal
savings and loans and that the legislative history did not limit such authority).
52. See 550 U.S. 1, 10-11, 16 (2007) (emphasizing that operating subsidiaries only
engage in activities which the national bank undertakes).
53. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2005) (announcing that state laws apply to operating
subsidiaries to the same extent that they apply to national banks); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 445.1625(1), 493.52(1) (West 2009) (protecting consumers from lending
abuses by requiring mortgage brokers and servicers to register with the state). But see
Watters, 550 U.S. at 21-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for holding
that 12 C.F.R. section 7.4006 preempts Michigan's law without clear congressional
intent).
54. See 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2716 (2009) (asserting that the enactment of the National
Bank Act did not alter the meaning of visitorial powers and law enforcement).
55. See Brief for the Petitioner Cuomo at 12, Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No.
08-453) (requesting national banks voluntarily produce additional data because
compared to whites, Latino and African-American borrowers received a greater
percentage of high-interest loans).
56. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2005) (prohibiting state officials from enforcing state
laws against national banks); Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714 (noting that the New York
Attorney General sent letters, "in lieu of subpoena[s]," to several national banks,
requesting non-public information about their lending practices).
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A) (2006) (pronouncing that state law applies to
national banks unless preempted by federal law). But see Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718
(rejecting the OCC's contention that the Riegle-Neal Act establishes that the OCC's
visitation powers preempt state law enforcement).
58. See § 36(f)(1)(A) (stating that state laws will not apply if they discriminate
against national banks).
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OCC's rule was unreasonable because it prohibited states from enforcing
their own laws, noting that "visitation" is limited to the oversight of
national banks.5 9 In overruling the OCC's regulation, the Court relied on
Guthrie v. Harkness, a case where the Court found that filing a suit
requiring a national bank to
produce its corporate records was not an
60
powers.
visitorial
of
exercise
Predatory lending is usually associated with non-depository creditors,
such as pawn shops and payday lenders.61 Yet, after Watters, predatory
lending became a growing concern because of the OCC's claim to have
exclusive authority to enforce state predatory lending laws against national
banks.62 On their part, states condemned the OCC's regulation, noting that
the OCC's exclusive authority to enforce lending laws against national
banks resulted in discriminatory lending practices that primarily targeted
minorities.6 3
III. ANALYSIS
A. Cuomo ProperlyLimited Watters' Impact on Minorities by
DistinguishingBetween State VisitorialPowers and
Enforcement of State Law
Watters held that operating subsidiaries of national banks were subject to

the OCC's visitorial regimes, not the states' .64 As a result, in Cuomo, the
OCC and national banks argued that states were also prohibited from
enforcing state predatory lending laws against national banks and their
operating subsidiaries. 6' However, the Cuomo decision properly limited
59. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715-18 (pointing out that the federal government can
exercise general oversight over national banks without preempting state law).
60. See 199 U.S. 148, 154-55, 159 (1905) (holding that a shareholder has the right
to inspect the corporate books to ensure that his investment is not being mismanaged).
61. Cf Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting off More than They Can
Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 521 (2007) (observing that some of the major predatory
lenders operate as subsidiaries of depository institutions).
62. See Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 5, at 25-26 (claiming that
Congress granted the OCC the authority to issue preemptive regulations pursuant to the
National Bank Act).
63. See Brief for the States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-13,
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08-453) (criticizing the OCC's enforcement
efforts against national banks and arguing that states are more successful in
enforcement actions against national banks).
64. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11-15, 21 (2007) (stressing
that states' duplicative examination and supervision laws would burden operating
subsidiaries).
65. See Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 5, at 44-45 (presuming that
enforcement of state law is a type of visitorial power prohibited by the National Bank
Act).
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the impact of the Watters' holding on minorities by finding the OCC's
regulation unreasonable because the National Bank Act does not preclude
66
banks.
states from enforcing state predatory lending laws against national

While the National Bank Act prohibits states from exercising visitorial
powers over national banks, visitorial powers cannot be equated with law
enforcement. 67 Instead, visitorial powers are synonymous with supervisory
authority, such as conducting on-site examinations of national banks. 68 In
filing suits to enforce state predatory lending laws, states are not overseeing
national banks. Rather, states are acting as law enforcers, and claims
against national banks that allege discriminatory lending practices must be
grounded on a legitimate basis of law and fact.69
On their part, the OCC and national banks argued that Watters further
supported their claim that states were prohibited from enforcing state law
because the state law at issue in Cuomo was similar to the state law that
was held preempted by federal regulation in Watters.70 However, in
Watters, the Court only addressed whether operating subsidiaries were
subject to states' general supervision and control, not whether states were
prohibited from enforcing their predatory lending laws against operating
subsidiaries. 7'
In addition, Cuomo's interpretation that enforcement of state law differs
from state visitorial powers adheres to precedent.72 For instance, in
Guthrie v. Harkness, the Court concluded that a judicial order requiring a
national bank to produce its corporate records was not an exercise of
66. Compare Watters, 550 U.S. at 11 (upholding 12 C.F.R. section 7.4006 and
holding that operating subsidiaries are not subject to a state's licensing, reporting, and
visitorial regimes), with Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715-17
(2009) (overruling 12 C.F.R. section 7.4000 because visitation does not encompass law
enforcement), and Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 5, at 44-45
(acknowledging that Watters did not define visitation).
67. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2716 (asserting that lower courts interpret visitation to
mean the act of examining the way in which a national bank conducts business).
68. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner Cuomo, supra note 55, at 20 (describing
visitorial powers as the authority to grant charters and conduct examinations to ensure
the security of national banks).
69. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2719 (pointing out that by acting as litigants, states
are subject to sanctions for filing frivolous claims against national banks).
70. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1661, 493.56b (West 2009)
(granting Michigan's commissioner the right to supervise and control registered lenders
and to conduct examinations and investigations regarding their operations), with N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 2006) (authorizing the attorney general to sue to
rectify fraud).
71. Contra Brief for the Respondent Clearing House Ass'n at 27, Cuomo, 129 S.
Ct. 2710 (No. 08-453) (contending that the issue in Watters was whether states could
exert examination and enforcement authority over operating subsidiaries).
72. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100,
105-106 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (noting that an agency's investigation of bank fraud does not
constitute an exercise of visitorial powers).
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visitorial powers because it was not part of the bank's general oversight.7 3
Similarly, the National Bank Act does not preclude states from enforcing
state predatory lending laws because such enforcement is not an oversight
of national banks.74 Indeed, for decades, courts have granted states the
right to enforce their general lending laws against national banks.75
Predatory lending is causing a wave of foreclosure that has a
disproportionate effect on minorities.76 If Cuomo had failed to narrow the
Watters holding, the adverse impact on minorities would have been even
more pronounced because the OCC believes it has exclusive authority to
enforce state predatory lending laws, and, unlike the states, the OCC rarely
enforces predatory lending laws against national banks.77 In enacting the
National Bank Act, Congress was concerned that states would interfere
with the operation of the national banking system, and thus, it limited states
from conducting banking examinations; however, the Cuomo holding
correctly distinguished visitorial powers from law enforcement because the
Act does not preclude states from enforcing predatory lending laws which
78
aim to protect minorities from abusive lending practices.
B. Cuomo ProperlyHeld that States Are Authorized to Enforce State
PredatoryLending Laws Against NationalBanks Because There Was No
Clear CongressionalIntent Preempting State Enforcement of State Laws
Cuomo correctly ruled that the National Bank Act did not preempt
enforcement of state laws because a presumption against preemption
applies to states' exercise of their historic police powers and there was no
clear congressional intent prohibiting states from enforcing state law
against national banks. 79 For instance, in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

73. See 199 U.S. 148, 157 (1905) (distinguishing a shareholder's non-visitorial
right to sue in court from the OCC's visitorial right to examine a bank's records).
74. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718 (observing that if the OCC's interpretation of
visitorial powers were adopted, both state and federal agencies would be precluded
from enforcing lending laws).
75. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 660-61 (1924) (upholding
a state's right to file suit against a national bank to enforce a state anti-bank-branching
law).
76. See Fishbein & Bunce, supra note 16, at 276 (stressing that the high foreclosure
rates in the subprime market is evidence that borrowers are receiving loans that they
cannot afford).

77. See Andrews, supra note 14 (noting that the federal government ignored

repeated warnings regarding increased predatory lending practices).

78. Cf Cuomo, 129 S.Ct. at 2722 (explaining that the state Attorney General's
threat to issue subpoenas in connection with a fraud investigation is not an exercise of
enforcement powers "vested in the courts of justice").
79. See id.
at 2721 (countering the dissent by noting that while the OCC's authority
to enforce non-preempted state law began in 1966, states have enforced state law
against national banks for the past eighty-five years).
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the Court stated that when federal law purports to preempt states' historic
police powers, the Court begins by assuming that Congress did not intend
to preempt state law. 0 States traditionally have had the responsibility of
overseeing the protection of consumers from abusive lending practices. 8'
All states have enacted legislative measures to protect consumers from
unfair and deceptive lending practices and more than half of the states have
enacted laws curbing predatory lending. 2
Unlike in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, where the Court
recognized that Congress clearly granted the Board power to regulate
federal savings associations, the language of the National Bank Act does
not clearly indicate that states are prohibited from enforcing state predatory
lending laws.83 The National Bank Act provides that national banks are
exempt from state visitation, but the National Bank Act does not define the
term "visitation" and courts
have not interpreted the term to mean the
84
enforcement of state law.
Like in Gregory,where the Court recognized that citizens of a state have
a right to establish the qualifications of public officials and refused to
uphold a federal law preempting state law without clear congressional
intent, Cuomo similarly recognized that states have an interest in enacting
and enforcing consumer protection laws and refused to uphold the OCC's
regulation.85 Furthermore, as in Gregory, Cuomo s refusal to uphold the
preemption of state enforcement of state law without clear congressional
intent maintains the constitutional balance of power between the states and
the federal government.8 6
80. See 331 U.S. 218, 230-32 (1947) (recognizing that Congress may act to prevent

subsequent state regulation relating to traditional state police powers when a strong
federal interest is at stake).
81. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990)

(conceding that consumer protection is a power reserved to states and compelling
evidence is required to preempt state law).
82. See First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 660 (1924) (noting that it is
contradictory to allow states to enact a law but then deny states the authority to enforce
it); Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Anti-PredatoryLending Laws: The Effect
ofLegal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 47, 49 (2008) (pointing out that
only six states have failed to adopt legislation addressing predatory lending).
83. Compare Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160-61
(1982) (finding that federal law imposes no limits on the Board's right to issue
regulations), with Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718 (criticizing the OCC's interpretation of
the National Bank Act as extreme because it denies states the authority to enforce any
state law against national banks).
84. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715 (holding that simply because the term visitation
is ambiguous does not mean the term merits Chevron deference).
85. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (stressing that states
maintain substantial sovereign powers which Congress may not easily undermine). But
see Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2732 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that no presumption
against preemption applies where Congress expressly preempted state law).
86. See Brief for the Petitioner Cuomo, supra note 55, at 43 (cautioning that
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For its part, the OCC argued that the Riegle-Neal Act granted the OCC
exclusive authority to enforce consumer protection laws against national
banks, however, the OCC's interpretation is inconsistent with the passage
of the Act.8 7 In enacting the Riegle-Neal Act, Congress acknowledged that
states have an important interest in protecting consumers, particularly in
combating housing and lending discrimination.88 Furthermore, in the
Conference Report of the Riegle-Neal Act, the conferees criticized the
OCC for its aggressive stance in preempting state law.89 In enacting its
preemptive rule, the OCC exceeded its congressional authority and Cuomo
properly overruled the OCC's regulation because Congress did not intend
to preempt states from enforcing predatory lending laws against national
90

banks.

C. State Enforcement of State PredatoryLending Laws Does Not Pose an
"Undue Burden" on National Banks
In Barnett Bank of Marion, N.A. v. Nelson, the Court stated that national
banks are subject to state law, unless state law imposes an "undue burden"
upon them. 91 However, unlike the state law at issue in Barnett which
contradicted federal law by prohibiting national banks from selling
insurance in small towns, state enforcement of state predatory lending laws
does not pose an undue burden on national banks. 92 National banks argued
that permitting states to enforce state law would burden them, thereby
undermining the purpose of the National Bank Act.93 The OCC also claims

preemption of state law without clear congressional intent alters the scheme of political
accountability).
87. See Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 5, at 47 (asserting that the
OCC's interpretation of the Riegle-Neal Act reflects congressional intent). But see
H.R. REP. No. 103-651, at 13-14 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (reporting that the Riegle-Neal
Act would not undermine states' power to protect consumers).
88. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that barring certain exceptions,
state consumer protection and fair lending laws apply to national banks).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 103-651, at 53-54 (requiring the OCC to submit annual
reviews of its preemptive determinations pertaining to consumer protection and fair
lending laws noting that the OCC "[has] applied traditional preemptive principles in a
manner that ... is inappropriately aggressive, resulting in preemption of State law in
situations where the federal interest did not warrant that result").
90. See id. (stating that courts use a rule of construction where state and federal law
can co-exist).
91. See 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (observing that complying fully with state and
federal law is virtually impossible).
92. Compare id. (recognizing that a federal statute may be so pervasive as to leave
no room for state law), with Brief for the Petitioner Cuomo, supra note 55, at 6
(contending that generally, national banks are subject to both federal and state law).
93. See Brief for the Respondent Clearing House Ass'n, supra note 71, at 28-29
(stressing that the Court generally protects the national banking system from states'
burdensome regulations).
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that national banks rarely engage in predatory lending.94 Consequently,
state predatory lending laws only impact a small number of national banks
that issue abusive loan terms.
Furthermore, the OCC claims that predatory lending laws impose a high
cost on national banks; however, national banks can pass these costs on to
consumers. 95 Predatory lending laws do not forbid national banks from
charging high fees. Rather, the laws serve to monitor abusive loan terms.96
While national banks argue that it would be a burden to comply with
each state's different legal standard for determining whether a national
bank engages in unlawful discrimination, national banks have for decades
complied with differing state laws on other matters.9 7 Thus, unlike Barnett
where the Court considered a burdensome state law, the Court properly
overruled the OCC's regulation because there is no undue burden in state
enforcement of state laws and states have an interest in protecting
minorities from abusive loan terms by enforcing predatory lending law
against national banks.98
D. Cuomo's Interpretationof the NationalBank Act Is Consistent with the
FHA in that It Permits States to Enforce FairLending Laws Against
National Banks

The Court's conclusion in Cuomo that the National Bank Act does not
prohibit states from enforcing state predatory lending laws against national
banks adheres to the language of the FHA, which allows states to process

94. See Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46264, 46271 (Aug. 5,
2003) (claiming that subprime lending is carried out by mortgage and finance

companies). But see Review of the National Bank Preemption Rules Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 188 (2004) (statement of
Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Center for Responsible Lending) [hereinafter
Eakes Hearing] (testifying that national banks are a safe haven for predatory lending
because the OCC does not have adequate measures in place to prevent predatory
lending).
95. Compare 68 Fed. Reg. 46264, 46270 (Aug. 5, 2003) (claiming that state
predatory lending laws are vague, creating a potential for liability for national banks),
with Bagley, supra note 37, at 2306 (recognizing that subprime borrowers bear the
costs of predatory lending legislation in the form of price adjustment).
96. See Bagley, supra note 37, at 2306 (arguing that states have the right to limit
abusive loan terms as long as states do not significantly affect the national banking
system).
97. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 65 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that contract and property law apply to national banks despite
variation among state laws). But cf Brief for the Respondent Clearing House Ass'n,
supra note 71, at 28-29 (noting that a major disagreement has resulted as to whether the
HMDA data establishes a primafaciecase for discrimination).
98. See Barnett Bank of Marion, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996)
(highlighting that state law that significantly impairs the national banking system must
give way to the National Bank Act).
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fair lending complaints against national banks. 99 In enacting the FHA,
Congress expressed a preference for HUD to refer fair housing complaints
to state and local agencies.100 For instance, once HUD certifies a state or
local agency, HUD must refer discrimination complaints to those
agencies. 01 Contrastingly, while the OCC believes that only it possesses
essential experience to determine whether a national bank engages in
abusive lending practices, pursuant to the FHA's language, the OCC must
also cooperate with HUD
to ensure that national banks are in compliance
10 2
with fair lending laws.

The OCC argues that its procedures for supervising national banks
ensure that the banks comply with fair lending laws; however, the OCC
rarely enforces state lending laws against national banks.' 0 3 States, on the
other hand, have taken a more proactive role by issuing thousands of
enforcement actions to combat abusive lending practices. 10 4 Although the
OCC points out that it relies on statistical data to determine whether a
particular bank's lending policy has a disparate impact on minorities,
achieving the FHA's goal of eliminating discriminatory lending practices
requires the cooperation of multiple actors, including federal and state
agencies.' 05
Additionally, Cuomo correctly held that the National Bank Act does not

99. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (2006) (recognizing that states and local agencies play
a substantial role in enforcing the FHA).
100. See id. (permitting HUD to certify state and local agencies if their law is similar
to the FHA).
101. See id (reporting that HUD may act if the state agency fails to act within thirty
days of the referral).
102. Compare Brief for the Respondent Clearing House Ass'n, supra note 71, at 5354 (explaining that the OCC uses its "informal supervisory authority" to ensure that
national banks are in compliance with state and federal law), with 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)
(2006) (requiring agencies that have regulatory or supervisory authority over national
banks to cooperate with HUD).
103. See Memorandum of Plaintiff OCC in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 5-6, OCC v. Spitzer, 05 CV 5630 (S.D.N.Y. June 2005) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Plaintiff OCC] (stating that the HMDA data is an important tool in
combating state lending discrimination). But see Eakes Hearing, supra note 94, at 178
(criticizing the OCC's minimal efforts to protect consumers, as the OCC cites only one
case in which it was able to recover payments made to victims of abusive lending
practices).
104. See Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11-12,
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 05-1342) [hereinafter Brief
for AARP et al., Amici] (underscoring the OCC's ineffectiveness by noting that the
OCC lists only eight actions taken against national banks to combat predatory lending).
105. Compare Eakes Hearing, supra note 94, at 179 (criticizing the OCC by noting
that when Guaranty National Bank engaged in abusive lending practices, the OCC
collected $25,000 in fines yet borrowers had to rely on private actions to collect $41
million in settlement fees), with Memorandum of Plaintiff OCC, supra note 103, at 8-9
(implying that the OCC will take action to remedy a borrower's injury caused by
discriminatory lending practices).
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limit states from enforcing state predatory lending laws against national
banks because the Act does not address whether states are precluded from
doing so and the FHA specifically addresses the issue of discriminatory
lending, thereby granting states the authority to file suits against national
banks. 10 6 In overruling the OCC's exclusive authority to enforce state
predatory lending laws against national banks, Cuomo adhered to the FHA,
which requires multiple levels of107enforcement to eliminate national banks'
discriminatory lending practices.
E. The Court Should Apply a DisparateImpact Analysis to National Banks'
Subjective Lending PracticesBecause These PracticesHave a Disparate
Impact on Minorities in Violation of the FHA
In Cuomo, the Court did not address whether the OCC's exclusive
authority to enforce state predatory lending laws against national banks was
unlawful due to the regulation's disparate impact on minorities. 10 8
Generally, the Court is cautious to hold that a statute or regulation is
unlawful on the basis of a disparate impact analysis. 10 9 However, pursuant
to Title VII, the Court recognizes that employment practices that have a
disparate impact on members of a protected class are unlawful. 1 0 Because
the subjective criteria that employers use to carry out discriminatory
employment practices are similar to national banks' subjective lending
practices that have a disparate impact on minorities, the Court should apply
the disparate impact analysis of Title VII to FHA claims.' 11
1. DiscriminatoryIntent and DisparateImpact Are Unlawful Under Title
VII and the FHA
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court recognized that Congress
enacted Title VII with the intent to achieve equal employment
106. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)

(stressing that it is the judiciary's responsibility to reconcile law, recognizing that

certain statutes may be altered by later ones).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (2006) (requiring HUD to cooperate with federal,
state, and local agencies to eliminate discriminatory lending practices).
108. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714-15 (2009)
(explaining that the issue before the Court is whether the OCC's regulation preempting
state law enforcement is consistent with the National Bank Act).
109. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1288-89 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether a disparate impact claim is sufficient to establish a violation under the

FA).

110. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (stating that
neutral policies implemented to maintain prior discriminatory practices are unlawful).
111. See Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 256 (D. Mass.
2008) (claiming that a disparate impact analysis applies to subjective criteria when an
individual is adversely affected due to his race).
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opportunities and therefore broadly interpreted the law. 112 As support for
its decision, the Court noted that in testing an applicant's abilities, the
EEOC only permits the usage of job-related tests." 3 Similarly, the Court
should give deference to HUD's interpretation that lending practices that
have a disparate impact are unlawful because they violate the FHA.'1 4 For
instance, if HUD concludes that a less discriminatory policy or practice
could have been adopted, HUD may conclude that an existing policy is
discriminatory because of the policy's disparate impact on members of a
protected class.15

Even more importantly, the Court in Griggs stated that by enacting Title
VII, Congress intended to remove artificial and arbitrary employment
barriers that were established for discriminatory purposes." 6
In
determining loan terms, lenders may add charges that are unrelated to a
borrower's credit history." 7 However, the discretionary charges that
national banks add result in minorities having to pay higher loan
interests. 1 8 Consequently, in order to remove arbitrary lending practices
that have a disparate impact on minorities, the Court should apply a
disparate impact analysis to lenders' subjective lending criteria.' 19
Furthermore, the Court should recognize that Congress intended to
eradicate discriminatory lending and interpret the FHA broadly. 120 In
112. Cf 401 U.S. at 429 (affirming that Title VII does not establish that every
individual is guaranteed a job regardless of his qualifications).
113. See id. at 433-34 (stating that administrative agencies, like the EEOC, are
entitled to judicial deference). But see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 241, 245 (2006)
(holding that interpretative rulings are not entitled to deference merely because they
interpret an ambiguous regulation).
114. See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship, H.U.D.A.L.J. 08-92-0010-1, at 25
(Mar. 22, 1993) (Initial Decision and Order) (announcing that a plaintiff can establish a
primafacie case of disparate impact using statistics).
115. Contra Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266,
18269 (April 15, 1994) (offering guidelines for agencies to determine when a disparate
impact violation exists and cautioning that the fact that a policy or action results in a
disparate impact is not conclusive proof of a violation under the FHA).
116. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (reporting that under a disparate impact claim, a
defendant can avoid liability by showing a "business necessity").
117. See, e.g., Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 255 (D.
Mass. 2008) (believing that discretionary pricing allows lenders to add subjective
charges and fees).
118. See BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 22 (expressing that discretionary pricing
policies permit lenders to waive objective pricing criteria, which grossly favors white
borrowers). But see Miller, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (realizing that credit scores explain
part of the lending disparities).
119. Cf Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 977 (1988) (admitting
that neutral employment practices in operation can be equivalent to intentional
discrimination).
120. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1289 (7th Cir. 1997) (asserting that the purpose of Title VII and the FHA is to eradicate
disparate treatment and impact); 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen.
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enacting the law, Congress did not aim to limit relief only to plaintiffs that
could prove discriminatory intent. 12
For example, in Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the court noted that requiring plaintiffs to
prove such intent can be a heavy burden to meet. 122 Thus, plaintiffs should
be able to prove that national banks engage in discriminatory lending
practices by showing discriminatory effect without having to prove
discriminatory
intent; otherwise, discriminatory lending practices will go
12 3
unpunished.

2. The HMDA Data Establishes a PrimaFacie Case of DisparateImpact
Under the FHA

Under the FHA, in order for a plaintiff to meet his burden of proof, the
plaintiff must show that a specific policy or practice caused a significant
disparate impact on members of a protected class.124 In attempting to prove
the first part of the test, plaintiffs often allege that discretionary pricing
policies are the discriminatory practices used by lenders. 25 National banks
might contend that discretionary pricing policies are not discriminatory
because pricing policies are determined primarily based on objective
criteria, such as creditworthiness. However, when subjective and objective
criteria are combined, the resulting lending practices are subject to a
disparate impact analysis. 126 It is the subjective criteria that national banks
use that enable them to charge 127borrowers with similar credit histories
different prices for the same loan.
Under the second and third parts of a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff
must plead a disparate impact and facts that raise a sufficient inference of
causation between the disparate impact and a lender's specific and
Mondale) (arguing that de facto segregation and a failure to achieve fair housing will

deny blacks the opportunity to equal education and employment).
121. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288 (declining to read the
FHA narrowly because certain practices may have a necessary and foreseeable
discriminatory impact which can perpetuate housing segregation).
122. See id. at 1290 (concluding that in enacting the FHA, Congress did not intend
to permit disparate impact simply because defendants act discreetly).
123. Cf Watson, 487 U.S. at 978 (recognizing that if an employer uses an interview
for hiring, the subjective practice is subject to a disparate impact analysis).
124. See Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 992, 92728 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs meet their burden of proof by singling out
the subjective part of a lending policy that relies on subjective and objective criteria).
125. See, e.g., Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253 (D.
Mass. 2008) (discussing plaintiffs contentions that lending disparity is the result of
lenders' pricing policy that allows subjective markups).
126. Cf Watson, 487 U.S. at 978-79 (rejecting the argument that a Title VII claim
can only be established through a showing of disparate treatment).
127. See Miller, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (arguing that subjective decision making,
and charges that are unrelated to creditworthiness more specifically, should not play a
part in determining a borrower's credit eligibility).
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actionable policy. 128 The HMDA data sufficiently demonstrates that
lenders' subjective criteria have an adverse effect on minorities. 129 In
particular, the HMDA data concludes that regardless of income level,
minorities are more likely to get high-annual percentage rate loans than
whites. 130 For example, the HMDA data reported that in 2006, AfricanAmericans were almost fifty-four percent more likely than whites to
receive higher priced loans.131
Lenders attempt to undermine the accuracy of the HMDA data, pointing
to the fact that it fails to take into account a borrower's credit history;
however, while credit differences may explain part of the lending disparity,
using discretionary pricing policies leads to a significant lending disparity
that adversely affects minorities. 32 Additionally, new studies that
supplement the HMDA data by taking into account borrowers' credit
history also concluded that African-American and Latinos receive higher
interest loans than whites. 133 Consequently, the Court should recognize
that the HMDA data sufficiently establishes thit national banks engage in
discriminatory lending practices in violation of the FHA, and thus, the
Court should overrule an OCC regulation as unlawful if the regulation
1 34
results in lending disparities that have a disparate impact on minorities.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
As more minorities' homes are foreclosed, Congress needs to enact
128. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 978 (finding that quotas and preferential treatment
adopted to avoid a violation based on a disparate impact claim contradict the purpose of
Title VII).
129. See AVERY ET AL., FED. RES. BD. Div. OF RESOURCES & STATISTICS, THE 2006
HMDA
DATA
43
(2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2007
/pdf/hmda06draft.pdf [hereinafter THE 2006 HMDA DATA] (suggesting that differences
in loan pricing between racial groups might be the result of discriminatory treatment).
130. See Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 922, 92829 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (alleging that minorities are charged more for non risk-related
criteria than whites).
131. See THE 2006 HMDA DATA, supra note 129, at 38-39 (finding that for three
consecutive years, minorities were more likely than whites to receive higher-priced
loans).
132. See Ramirez, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 928-29 (contending that credit differences
alone do not account for the fact that minorities are fifty percent more likely than
whites to receive a high priced loan). But see Robert B. Avery et al., New Information
Reported Under HMDA and Its Application in FairLending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES.
BULL. 344, 393 (Summer 2005) (suggesting that the accusations of legal bias reported
on the HMDA data might decrease loans available to less creditworthy applicants).
133. See BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 3-5 (advancing the idea that pricing
disparities may be the result of the inconsistent use of objective pricing criteria that
adversely affects minorities).
134. Cf Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 256 (D. Mass.
2008) (stressing that if an employer's subjective decision making has a disparate
impact effect, then the subjective decision making is grounds for a disparate impact
analysis).
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tougher anti-predatory legislation. 135 However, Congress should only set
federal protection as a floor, not a ceiling, and grant states the authority to
enact and
enforce anti-predatory lending laws that address states' local
36
needs.
Recently, the House passed a bill to curb predatory lending that mirrored
many states' predatory lending laws. 37 Although the bill did not pass in
the Senate, the House recognized the importance of state predatory lending
laws in curbing the practice. 138
In enacting tougher federal legislation to curb predatory lending,
Congress should not preempt states from enforcing state law because states
have a responsibility to protect consumers from abusive lending
practices. 39 More importantly, states should have the ability to respond to
the loopholes that predatory lenders exploit to circumvent federal
legislation. 140 Additionally, states' predatory lending laws are curbing
predatory lending without hindering borrower access to subprime credit. 141
On the other hand, Congress should clearly limit the OCC's authority to
preempt states from enforcing state predatory lending laws.' 42 An agency's
determination to preempt state law is not equivalent to congressional
statutory preemption. ' 43 Congress may preempt state law, but unlike
135. See Ruth Mantell, Minority Families Face Wave of Foreclosures: Consumers
Groups Urge More 'Teeth' in Laws Combating Predators, MARKETWATCH, July 6,

2007,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/minority-families-face-wave-fore
closures/story.aspx?guid=%7B439B2AE2-4ECB-47F0-9BFO-B661486CCCB5%7D
(reporting that the foreclosure crisis will cause more than a quarter-million minority
families to lose their homes).
136. See generally Azmy, supra note 38, at 295 (asserting that states serve as
laboratories of experimentation for federal legislation).
137. See Mortgage Reform & Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (expanding federal law protection by increasing the
number of loans that qualify as high-cost loans).
138. See id. (establishing that the bill is meant to provide only a minimum standard
for lending practices in the consumer mortgage loan industry).
139. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states powers not delegated to the

United States Government by the Constitution).
140. See Federal Preemption Favors Predatory Lending: States Have an Edge in
Protecting Homeowners, CRL LEGIS. BRIEF (Center for Responsible Lending,

Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/ib-preemption-nov-2-2007.pdf
[hereinafter
Federal Preemption Favors PredatoryLending] (claiming that states effectively fight

predatory lenders because states are not removed from the day-to-day market).
141. See, e.g., Bostic et al., supra note 82, at 65 (noting that despite some state's
broader predatory lending laws, applications for subprime loans are higher while denial
rates are lower).
142. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 109 (1993) (explaining that when enacting
a law, Congress, unlike an administrative agency, is responsible for considering all
interests).
143. Contra United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 384, 386-87 (1961)
(acknowledging that a federal regulation can preempt state law).
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agency rulemaking, Congress' legislative preemption of state law
undergoes both bicameralism and presentment; in preempting states from
enforcing state predatory lending laws, the OCC exercised more authority
than Congress.'
Furthermore, while courts defer to an agency's
interpretation because they value the agency's expertise, they should
remain mindful that the OCC will likely forgo states' interests and exceed
its authority due to the institutional pressures that it faces.1 45 For example,
the OCC receives a substantial amount of its funding from the banks it
oversees; this provides the OCC with a financial incentive to grant itself
exclusive authority not only to oversee, but also to enforce state laws
1 46
against national banks.
In enacting stronger federal legislation to curb predatory lending,
Congress should complement and not preempt state law. 47 Given that the
OCC is less accountable than elected officials and the OCC's financial
incentives make its decisions more susceptible to bias, Cuomo correctly
overruled the OCC's preemptive ruling. 48 In order to protect minorities
from abusive lending practices, states need flexibility to enact and enforce
laws that address states' specific needs.
V. CONCLUSION
Consumer protection is historically a state responsibility, and more
recently, states are enacting predatory lending laws to curb abusive lending
practices that target minorities in particular. 49 In preempting states from
enforcing their own predatory lending laws, the OCC's regulation
weakened states' efforts to protect minorities, as the regulation stripped
states of their authority to ensure that national banks were in compliance
144. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 142, at 110 (contending that by shifting decision
making authority to agencies, laws pass easier than they would pass under a unicameral

legislature).

145. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Federalism, Consumer Protectionand the Regulatory
Preemption:A Casefor Heightened JudicialReview, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 273,
300-04 (2008) (arguing that federal regulations that preempt state law should be subject
to heightened judicial review); see also Eakes Hearing, supra note 94, at 178 (reporting
that in 2002, states collected $500 million for victims of predatory lending, compared
to the $7 million recovered by the OCC).
146. See Brief for AARP et al., Amici, supra note 104, at 13 (reporting that in 2005,
ninety-seven percent of the OCC's funding came from the banks the agency
supervised).
147. See Federal Preemption Favors Predatory Lending, supra note 140
(maintaining that preempting state law harms borrowers because federal law cannot
respond to the innovations of predatory lenders).
148. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 145, at 302 (indicating that judicial interference is
necessary when an agency's decision-making presents a conflict of interest for the
agency).
149. See generally Eakes Hearing, supra note 94 (noting that states enact tough
measures to curb predatory lending without eliminating access to subprime credit).
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Cuomo correctly overruled the OCC's
with state lending laws. 150
regulation because there is no clear congressional intent to preempt states
from enforcing state predatory lending laws and the HMDA data
In
establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA.'
order to adequately protect minorities from predatory lenders, Congress
should use its authority to complement and not supersede state law because
states are in a better position to enact and enforce tougher consumer
measures.152 Unless there is clear congressional intent, courts should
refrain from upholding a federal regulation preempting state laws-enacted
under states' historical police powers-that combat a practice causing a
disparate impact on minorities.' 53

150. See generally Brief for the Petitioner Cuomo, supra note 55 (stressing that the
OCC's responsibility to protect consumers from abusive lenders conflicts with the
OCC's duty to ensure a competitive banking system).
151. See BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 7 (showing that race and neighborhood
racial composition significantly impact the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan).
152. See Eakes Hearing, supra note 94, at 175 (claiming that the federal government
is removed from predatory lenders and states need authority to intervene in the wave of
home foreclosures).
153. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (announcing
that a presumption against preemption applies to states' historic police powers).

